

Risk Apportionment: The Dual Story*

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Abstract

By specifying new model free preferences towards simple nested classes of lottery pairs, we develop the dual story to stand on equal footing with that of (primal) risk apportionment. The dual story provides an intuitive interpretation, and full characterization, of dual counterparts of such concepts as prudence and temperance. The direction of preference between these nested classes of lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function within Yaari's (1987) dual theory. We explore implications of our results for optimal portfolio choice and show that the sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function may be naturally linked to a self-protection problem.

Keywords: Higher Order Risk Attitudes; Prudence; Temperance; Risk Apportionment; Non-Expected Utility Theory; Portfolio Choice; Self-Protection.

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1 Introduction

Although first received with some skepticism, the notions of prudence and temperance have now been widely accepted almost on par with the fundamental concept of risk aversion, at least in an expected utility (EU) framework.

The expanding use of these notions, sometimes termed “higher order risk attitudes”, can be explained by the fact that they were progressively given a more general interpretation. Consider prudence, for instance. This term was coined by Kimball (1990) in an influential paper in which he showed that precautionary savings as an optimizing type of behavior is characterized in an EU framework by a positive third derivative of the utility function (i.e., “ $U''' \geq 0$ ” or “prudence”). However, it is by now well-known that this positive sign of U''' can be interpreted more generally outside the specific decision problem of saving. This more primitive interpretation of prudence was initiated by Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980), who used the term “downside risk aversion”, and it was further pursued in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), who also showed how to proceed from prudence to higher order risk attitudes. These authors first state a “model free” preference, namely that decision makers (DM’s) like to “combine good with bad” instead of having to face either everything good or everything bad. Next, this model free preference is shown to be translated into prudence ($U''' \geq 0$) within the EU model, and from prudence—by defining a sequence of nested lotteries and always asserting the preference for combining good with bad—the higher order risk attitudes may be obtained similarly, starting with temperance ($U'''' \leq 0$) at the fourth order.

An advantage of the characterization of prudence and higher order risk attitudes in terms of simple primitive assumptions on preferences is that it allows evaluating these virtues in their own right instead of evaluating their implications in specific applications. It turns out besides that the simple primitive interpretation of prudence and higher order risk attitudes found in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) lends itself easily to experimental verification. As a result, there is now an intensive experimental research activity around the concepts of prudence and temperance in an EU framework (e.g., Ebert and Wiesen (2011, 2014), Deck and Schlesinger (2010, 2014), and Noussair, Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014), to name a few).

The preference for “combining good with bad” has appeared under different names in the literature. It was called “risk apportionment” in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). A little earlier, Chiu (2005) referred to a “precedence relation”, in which one stochastic dominant change precedes another. The phrase “combining good with bad” as a primitive trait first appeared in Eeckhoudt, Schlesinger and Tsetlin (2009).

While prudence, temperance, and higher order risk attitudes can be presented initially as natural properties in a model free environment, their interpretation and implementation have been developed so far exclusively within an EU framework.¹ The first result in this paper provides a characterization of these (primal) virtues within Yaari’s (1987) dual theory (DT). This characterization reveals that a DT maximizer likes to combine good with bad, when formulated as a “location preference” of always being more willing to accept an extra zero-mean risk in a state where wealth is higher than in a state where wealth is lower as in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), if and only if the probability weighting function of the DT model is the identity function; then DT simplifies to expected value maximization, which, of course, is also a special case of EU. This result illustrates that while (primal) prudence and higher order risk attitudes are often presented as being model free, and rightfully so, they may have, at the same time, no specific meaning outside EU.

Next, by specifying new model free preferences towards simple nested classes of lottery pairs, we develop the dual story to stand on equal footing with that of (primal) risk apportionment. The dual story provides an intuitive interpretation, and full characterization, of dual counterparts of such concepts as prudence, temperance, and other virtues. We show that the direction of preference between the nested classes of lottery pairs that we construct is equivalent to signing the m^{th} derivative of the probability weighting (or distortion) function within DT, with m an arbitrary positive integer.² It turns out that this development requires

¹In very recent work, Baillon (2017) generalizes these interpretations of prudence and higher order risk attitudes to a setting featuring ambiguity.

²One may therefore say that this paper constitutes the genuine appropriate dual counterpart of (primal) risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). Indeed, from a technical perspective, the contribution of the present paper to the extant literature on (dual or inverse) stochastic ordering in DT (e.g., Muliere and Scarsini (1989), Wang and Young (1998) and Chateauneuf, Gajdos and Wilthien (2002)) is similar to the contribution of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) to the literature on (primal) stochastic ordering in EU (e.g., Whitmore (1970), Ekern (1980) and Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980)).

a fundamental departure from the approach of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), which is unable to deliver the desired implications within the DT framework. The dual story we develop retains generic features of the primal story—e.g., a precedence relation—but crucially departs from it in its construction and implementation—e.g., by reference to what we will refer to as “squeezing” and “anti-squeezing” and to the “dual moments”.

This paper thus represents a first step towards a more general interpretation of higher order risk attitudes within alternative non-EU decision models, such as rank-dependent utility and prospect theory (Quiggin (1982), Schmeidler (1986, 1989), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), for which DT is a building block. Indeed, because DT is “orthogonal” to EU, our analysis not only reveals the differences with the primal story under EU, but it is also a prerequisite for a development of higher order risk attitudes as primitive traits of behavior compatible with the more general models of choice under risk provided by rank-dependent utility and prospect theory. These decision theories require their own “model free” preferences to characterize properties of the preference representations.

A positive sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function is consistent with an “inverse S-shape”, exhibited by the popular probability weighting functions proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) (see also Wu and Gonzalez (1996, 1998)) and Prelec (1998) under typical parameter sets implied by experiments.³ These inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions typically feature a positive sign for the odd derivatives and an alternating sign (first negative at low probability levels, then positive at high probability levels) for the even derivatives. Provided that the probability weighting function is first concave and then convex with second derivative equal to zero at the inflection point, a positive sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function implies that the function becomes more concave when moving to the left of the inflection point and becomes more convex when moving to the right of the inflection point. Our simple characterizations may spark an interest in a direct analysis of the signs of the probability weighting function’s derivatives.

As is well-known, primal and dual stochastic dominance coincide up to the second order

³The inverse S-shape reflects the psychological notion of diminishing sensitivity (in the domain of probabilities), which stipulates that DM’s become less (more) sensitive to changes in the objective probabilities when they move away from (towards) the reference points 0 and 1.

and may diverge from the third order onwards. As a by-product, of interest in its own right, the model free story appropriate for DT will nicely make apparent the fundamental reason behind this divergence.

Our results about the shape of the probability weighting function are relevant for the analysis of well-known problems in the economics of risk, such as portfolio choice and the level of self-protection in the presence of a background risk. We first illustrate our results by deriving their implications for optimal portfolio choice with a risky asset, a risk-free asset and access to zero-mean financial derivative products on the risky asset. We show that, contrary to under EU (Gollier (1995)), an m^{th} order improvement of the risky asset's return, achieved by supplementing (hence, squeezing) the risky asset with an appropriate selection of derivative products (e.g., a straddle at the third order or a volatility spread at the fourth order), never reduces the demand for the risky asset under the DT model. Furthermore, we show that the third derivative of the probability weighting function naturally appears in a self-protection problem that trades off the risk of a loss and the effort of protecting against the loss, in the presence of an independent background risk. In particular, if the third derivative of the probability weighting function is positive ("dual prudence"), the background risk stimulates self-protection.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we fix the notation and setting, introduce some preliminaries for the DT decision model, and provide some basic intuition and a formal characterization motivating our results. In Section 3, we introduce dual higher order risk attitudes by developing new model free preferences. Section 4 contains the formal presentation of our general results. Section 5 first illustrates implications of our results for optimal portfolio choice and next shows that the sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function is naturally linked to a self-protection problem. We conclude in Section 6 with a summary of the results and an indication of potential extensions. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

2 Preliminaries, Intuition and a Characterization

2.1 Notation and Setting

We represent an n -state lottery A , assigning probabilities p_i to final wealth outcomes x_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$, by $A = [x_1, p_1 ; \dots ; x_n, p_n]$. We always assume that states are ordered according to their associated outcomes, from the lowest outcome state to the highest outcome state. Outcomes are assumed to be non-negative. That is, $0 \leq x_1 \leq \dots \leq x_n$. With each lottery, generating a probability distribution over outcomes, one can associate a random variable. Henceforth, the lottery and its associated random variable are often identified. We write $P[A \leq x] = F_A(x) = 1 - S_A(x)$, with F_A and S_A the cumulative and decumulative distribution functions of A , respectively. Furthermore, we denote by \succeq a (weak) preference relation over lotteries.

Under Yaari's (1987) dual theory (DT), the evaluation V of the n -state lottery A is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V[A] &= V[F_A] = \int_0^\infty x \, dh(F_A(x)) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n x_i (h(F_A(x_i)) - h(F_A(x_{i-1}))), \end{aligned} \tag{2.1}$$

with $x_0 = 0$ and $F_A(x_0) = 0$ by convention, and with $h : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ satisfying $h(0) = 0$, $h(1) = 1$, and $h' \geq 0$, a probability weighting (or distortion) function, henceforth assumed to be differentiable for all degrees of differentiation on $(0, 1)$.⁴ We sometimes denote by $h^{(m)}$ the

⁴In the literature, following Yaari (1987), the evaluation under DT is often carried out by distorting the decumulative distribution function S_A instead of the cumulative distribution function F_A as in (2.1). Notice, however, that

$$V[A] = \int_0^\infty x \, dh(F_A(x)) = \int_0^\infty x \, d(1 - \bar{h}(S_A(x))) = \int_0^\infty \bar{h}(S_A(x)) \, dx,$$

with $\bar{h}(p) := 1 - h(1 - p)$, mapping the unit interval onto itself and satisfying $\bar{h}(0) = 0$, $\bar{h}(1) = 1$, and $\bar{h}' \geq 0$, and that positive signs of the higher order derivatives of \bar{h} are equivalent to alternating signs of the higher order derivatives of h . In particular, concavity of h translates to convexity of \bar{h} . To be consistent with the alternating signs of the derivatives of the utility function in the EU model, we define the evaluation V under DT by distorting the cumulative distribution function F_A rather than the decumulative distribution function S_A . Thus, in our setting a concave probability weighting function h is equivalent to ‘‘strong’’ risk aversion in the sense of aversion to mean preserving spreads (Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) and Ro ell (1987)), and, more generally, the higher order derivatives of the probability weighting function h will naturally alternate in sign,

m^{th} derivative of h .⁵

We say that a lottery B dominates a lottery A in third-degree dual (or inverse) stochastic dominance order if

$$\mathbb{E}[A] \leq \mathbb{E}[B], \quad \mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2)] \leq \mathbb{E}[\min(B_1, B_2)], \quad \text{and} \quad {}^3F_A^{-1} \leq {}^3F_B^{-1}.$$

Here, A_1 (B_1) and A_2 (B_2) are two independent draws from lottery A (B). Furthermore, ${}^{m+1}F_A^{-1}(q) = \int_0^q {}^mF_A^{-1}(p) dp$, $m = 1, 2, \dots$, $0 \leq q \leq 1$, with ${}^1F_A^{-1} \equiv F_A^{-1}$, and inequalities between functions are understood pointwise. We refer to $\mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2, \dots, A_m)]$ as the m^{th} “dual moment” of A .⁶ Similarly, we say that lottery B dominates lottery A in fourth-degree dual stochastic dominance order if

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[A] \leq \mathbb{E}[B], \quad \mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2)] \leq \mathbb{E}[\min(B_1, B_2)], \\ \mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2, A_3)] \leq \mathbb{E}[\min(B_1, B_2, B_3)], \quad \text{and} \quad {}^4F_A^{-1} \leq {}^4F_B^{-1}. \end{aligned}$$

In full generality, we say that lottery B dominates lottery A in m^{th} -degree dual stochastic dominance order ($m = 2, 3, \dots$) if

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[A] \leq \mathbb{E}[B], \quad \mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2)] \leq \mathbb{E}[\min(B_1, B_2)], \quad \dots, \\ \mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2, \dots, A_{m-1})] \leq \mathbb{E}[\min(B_1, B_2, \dots, B_{m-1})], \quad \text{and} \quad {}^mF_A^{-1} \leq {}^mF_B^{-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Preferences for m^{th} order dual stochastic dominance, with first $(m - 1)$ dual moments equal, just like that of U , under a precedence relation. (A preference for combining good with good and bad with bad will turn out to be consistent with all derivatives of h having the same (positive) sign.)

⁵We use the notations h' , h'' , \dots and $h^{(1)}$, $h^{(2)}$, \dots interchangeably.

⁶In statistics, these moments are sometimes referred to as mean (first) order statistics. They measure the expected worst outcome in an experiment with repeated independent draws; see also David (1981). Primal moments occur under EU when considering power functions as utility functions. Similarly, dual moments occur under DT when considering power functions as probability weighting functions:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2, \dots, A_m)] &= \int_0^\infty (1 - F_A(x))^m dx = \int_0^\infty \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x)) dx = \int_0^\infty x dh(F_A(x)) \\ &= V[A], \end{aligned}$$

with $\bar{h}(p) = p^m$ and $\bar{h}(p) = 1 - h(1 - p)$, $0 \leq p \leq 1$. Observe that the power probability weighting function satisfies $\bar{h}'' \geq 0$, hence $h'' \leq 0$.

are well-known to be linked to the sign of the m^{th} derivative of the probability weighting function within DT (Muliere and Scarsini (1989)), just like primal stochastic dominance orders are connected to the successive derivatives of the utility function under EU (Ekern (1980)). For further details on dual (inverse) stochastic dominance, we refer e.g., to De La Cal and Cárcamo (2010) and the references therein.

Under EU the sign of the m^{th} derivative of the utility function can be interpreted by comparing simple nested pairs of lotteries with equal $(m - 1)$ primal moments, obtained via the apportionment of harms (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). To interpret the sign of the m^{th} derivative of the probability weighting function under DT, we develop simple nested lottery pairs that have equal $(m - 1)$ dual moments.

2.2 Illustration and Intuition

Since it is well-known that EU and DT agree at the first and second orders in their evaluation of a sure reduction in wealth and a mean preserving spread (see Yaari (1986), Chew, Karni and Safra (1987), Roëll (1987) and Muliere and Scarsini (1989)) we develop here numerical examples to illustrate that they may, but need not, diverge at the third order. These examples build the intuition behind the reason why EU and DT may diverge at the third order and motivate the adjustments that have to be made to the story of “combining good with bad” used to interpret the signs of the successive derivatives of the utility function under EU. While it is known that third order primal and dual stochastic dominance do not in general coincide (see Muliere and Scarsini (1989) and its references), we illustrate their potential divergence here in the context of (primal) risk apportionment (Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)).

To motivate their paper in which they interpret the sign of U''' , Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980) refer to Mao’s lotteries⁷ given by

$$A = [0, 1/4 ; 2, 3/4], \quad B = [1, 3/4 ; 3, 1/4].$$

Note that A and B have the first two moments in common, that is, have the same mean and

⁷This name originates from the fact that these lotteries were used by James Mao (1970) in an experiment with business men.

variance. Lotteries A and B can be (viewed as) generated from a common initial lottery I given by

$$I = [1, 1/2 ; 2, 1/2],$$

to which an independent zero-mean risk $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ given by

$$\tilde{\varepsilon} = [-1, 1/2 ; 1, 1/2],$$

is “added”. If $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is added to the worst state of I (i.e., that with outcome 1) one generates A :

$$A = [1 + \tilde{\varepsilon}, 1/2 ; 2 + 0, 1/2],$$

while if $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is added to the best state of I (i.e., that with outcome 2) one generates B :

$$B = [1 + 0, 1/2 ; 2 + \tilde{\varepsilon}, 1/2].$$

Observe that B is obtained from I by adding the bad risk $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ (bad since $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is second order stochastically dominated by 0) to the good state of I while the converse is true for A . One might alternatively say that in A the bad ($\tilde{\varepsilon}$) precedes the good (0). In B , on the contrary, the good (0) precedes the bad ($\tilde{\varepsilon}$).⁸ Economic agents who like to “combine good with bad” prefer B to A . Under EU, this corresponds to $U''' \geq 0$. See Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) for a precise statement of this result.

Now consider DT instead of EU. What do we know for DT? Note first that A and B also have the first two *dual* moments in common, where the second dual moments amount to:

$$E [\min(A_1, A_2)] = (1 - (3/4)^2)0 + (3/4)^2 2 = 9/8.$$

$$E [\min(B_1, B_2)] = (1 - (1/4)^2)1 + (1/4)^2 3 = 9/8.$$

⁸This alternative presentation will be useful to understand the dual story explicated in the next section.

Furthermore, one easily computes that

$$V[A] = h(1/4)0 + (1 - h(1/4))2, \quad V[B] = h(3/4)1 + (1 - h(3/4))3,$$

with $h(0) = 0$, $h(1) = 1$, $h' \geq 0$, and where we assume $h'' \leq 0$. We now have the following result:

Proposition 2.1 *If h is quadratic, then $V[A] = V[B]$.*

Proposition 2.1 says that, under DT, the DM is indifferent between Mao's lotteries if the distortion function is quadratic. It suggests that, for this specific pair of lotteries, preferences are dictated by the behavior of higher order (> 2) derivatives of the distortion function. This is indeed confirmed by the next result (the formal general statement of which is deferred to Section 4 — see Theorem 4.1):

Proposition 2.2 *If $h''' \geq (\leq) 0$, then $V[A] \leq (\geq) V[B]$, that is, B is preferred (dispreferred) to A .*

Since EU and DT agree at the third order in their evaluations of Mao's lotteries (under EU $U''' \geq 0 \Rightarrow B \succeq A$ and under DT $h''' \geq 0 \Rightarrow B \succeq A$), one may wonder whether this result extends to all lottery pairs defined by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) at the third order (see, specifically, Definition 1 on p. 282 of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)). By providing two numerical examples, we show that EU and DT may, but need not, agree for these Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger pairs of lotteries.⁹

First, consider an initial lottery \tilde{I} given by

$$\tilde{I} = [4, 1/2 ; 10, 1/2],$$

and then add to one of the states the independent zero-mean risk $\tilde{\zeta}$ given by

$$\tilde{\zeta} = [-2, 1/2 ; 2, 1/2].$$

⁹It was sometimes conjectured — falsely, as we know now — that the agreement of EU and DT at the third order is true only for Mao's lotteries.

This generates either \tilde{A} or \tilde{B} given by

$$\tilde{A} = [2, 1/4 ; 6, 1/4 ; 10, 1/2], \quad \tilde{B} = [4, 1/2 ; 8, 1/4 ; 12, 1/4]. \quad (2.2)$$

Clearly, \tilde{A} and \tilde{B} again have the first two moments in common, and it is well-known that under EU,

$$U''' \geq (\leq) 0 \Rightarrow \tilde{B} \succeq (\preceq) \tilde{A}.$$

Now let us consider the comparison between \tilde{A} and \tilde{B} under DT. One easily verifies that \tilde{A} and \tilde{B} have the same mean and the same dual moments $E [\min(\tilde{A}_1, \tilde{A}_2)]$ and $E [\min(\tilde{B}_1, \tilde{B}_2)]$, which amount to

$$E [\min(\tilde{A}_1, \tilde{A}_2)] = (7/16)2 + (5/16)6 + (4/16)10 = 21/4.$$

$$E [\min(\tilde{B}_1, \tilde{B}_2)] = (12/16)4 + (3/16)8 + (1/16)12 = 21/4.$$

We have the following result:

Proposition 2.3 *If h is quadratic, then $V[\tilde{A}] = V[\tilde{B}]$.*

Besides, following the results developed in Section 4 (see Theorem 4.1), we find that:

Proposition 2.4 *If $h''' \geq (\leq) 0$, then $V[\tilde{A}] \leq (\geq) V[\tilde{B}]$, that is, \tilde{B} is preferred (dispreferred) to \tilde{A} .*

It thus turns out that for some lotteries used by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), EU and DT produce the same ranking at the third order. However, we now show by means of another example that this is not always the case. This “counterexample” serves to undermine the false impression given by Mao’s and, in fact, various other lotteries in the class of lotteries used by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), such as (2.2), that EU and DT agree at the third order. This divergence is, in principle, known but shown here explicitly for the Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) construction of apportioning a zero-mean risk.

Indeed, start from an initial lottery \hat{I} given by

$$\hat{I} = [2, 1/2 ; 3, 1/2],$$

and add the independent zero-mean risk $\tilde{\theta}$ given by

$$\tilde{\theta} = [-2, 1/3 ; 1, 2/3],$$

to one of the states of \hat{I} . Note that this zero-mean risk $\tilde{\theta}$ is very different from the previous ones we used ($\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\zeta}$): it is no longer symmetric and besides it will induce a change in the ranking of the states. Indeed, the new lotteries, after the apportionment of $\tilde{\theta}$, are \hat{A} and \hat{B} given by

$$\hat{A} = [0, 1/6 ; 3, 5/6], \quad \hat{B} = [1, 1/6 ; 2, 3/6 ; 4, 2/6].$$

From Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), we know that under EU,

$$U''' \geq (\leq) 0 \Rightarrow \hat{B} \succeq (\preceq) \hat{A},$$

and note that $E[\hat{A}] = E[\hat{B}]$, $\text{Var}[\hat{A}] = \text{Var}[\hat{B}]$, while $\text{Skew}[\hat{A}] < \text{Skew}[\hat{B}]$.

If we turn to DT and consider a quadratic distortion function so that $h''' = 0$, it can be shown that $\hat{A} \succeq \hat{B}$, producing a ranking at the third order different from EU: the EU DM is indifferent between \hat{A} and \hat{B} whenever $U''' = 0$. Indeed, with a probability weighting function

that satisfies the same properties as in the proof of Proposition 2.1,

$$\begin{aligned}
V[\hat{A}] &= ((1/6)(1 + \beta) - (1/36)\beta)0 + (1 - ((1/6)(1 + \beta) - (1/36)\beta))3 \\
&= 5/2 - (5/12)\beta. \\
V[\hat{B}] &= ((1/6)(1 + \beta) - (1/36)\beta)1 \\
&\quad + (((4/6)(1 + \beta) - (16/36)\beta) - ((1/6)(1 + \beta) - (1/36)\beta))2 \\
&\quad + (1 - ((4/6)(1 + \beta) - (16/36)\beta))4 \\
&= 5/2 - (7/12)\beta.
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, $V[\hat{A}] - V[\hat{B}] = (1/6)\beta \geq 0$ (since $0 \leq \beta \leq 1$), with $V[\hat{A}] - V[\hat{B}]$ strictly larger than zero whenever $\beta > 0$ (or $h'' < 0$). The basic reason for this result is the fact that the second dual moments of \hat{A} and \hat{B} differ.

It thus appears that the model free prescription that favors “combining good with bad” in the particular way as suggested by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) leads to an interpretation of the signs of the successive derivatives of U within the EU model; however, this model free principle does not always generate a similar interpretation for the signs of the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function under the DT framework. In fact, we formally show in the next subsection that requiring a DT maximizer to favor *any* primal risk apportionment is equivalent to requiring the probability weighting function to be the identity function. Thus, if one desires to obtain for DT and the signs of the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function a development that parallels that within EU, one has to modify the initial model free preferences. This is the purpose of Section 3.

2.3 Primal Risk Apportionment and DT: An Impossibility Theorem

As explained in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), primal risk apportionment can be formulated as a “location preference”. According to this formulation, which was noted already by Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schneider (1995), an individual is prudent if he prefers to shift a zero-mean increase in risk to the best outcomes of a lottery rather than to the worst outcomes, or,

likewise, prefers to shift a zero-mean decrease in risk to the worst outcomes of a lottery rather than to the best outcomes.

Formally, consider a decrease in risk, i.e., a change of an initial distribution F_A to a distribution G_0 by a mean preserving contraction represented through a function H , so $G_0(x) = F_A(x) + H(x)$, where H satisfies the usual properties:

$$\int_0^\infty H(y) dy = 0, \quad \int_0^x H(y) dy \leq 0, \quad x \in \mathbb{R}_+.$$

Then, a shift to the left by $t \geq 0$ of this decrease in risk is a translation of the mean preserving contraction and yields:

$$G_t(x) = F_A(x) + H(x + t),$$

where H and t are assumed to be such that G_t is a genuine cumulative distribution function of a non-negative random variable.

It follows from Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) that an EU maximizer prefers any such shift of a decrease in risk (which yields G_t) over the corresponding non-shifted decrease in risk (which yields G_0) if and only if $U''' \geq 0$. The following result shows that the same location preference holds for a DT maximizer if and only if h is the identity function, that is, if and only if DT reduces to expected value maximization. Thus, there exists no non-trivial probability weighting function such that the DT DM always exhibits this location preference.

Theorem 2.5 *Assume DT. Then, $V[G_t] - V[G_0] \geq 0$ for any F_A , H , and $t \geq 0$ as defined above, if and only if $h(p) = p$, $0 \leq p \leq 1$.*

3 Model Free Preferences

To provide an intuitive interpretation to the signs of the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function beyond the second order¹⁰ we now develop the appropriate model free preferences. We will continue to assert that DM's want to combine good with bad. In Chiu's

¹⁰As is well-known, both $U'' \leq 0$ and $h'' \leq 0$ correspond to strong risk aversion (i.e., aversion to mean preserving spreads); see the references in Section 2.2.

(2005) equivalent terminology, the DM still satisfies a precedence relation. He favors that the good precedes the bad. However, our definition of good and bad will be based on the concepts of “squeezing” and “anti-squeezing” a distribution instead of adding zero-mean risks and zero with certainty as in Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006). Squeezing and anti-squeezing will serve as the main building blocks in our approach. The sequence of squeezes and anti-squeezes that we develop will preserve dual rather than primal moments.

Squeezing occurs when we transform an initial lottery

$$L = [x_1, p_1 ; \dots ; x_i, p_i + p ; \dots ; x_j, p_j + p ; \dots ; x_n, p_n],$$

with $p_k \geq 0$ (where equality to zero is explicitly permitted), $k = 1, \dots, n$, and $p > 0$, into a lottery D given by

$$D = [x_1, p_1 ; \dots ; x_i, p_i ; x_i + x, p ; \dots ; x_j - x, p ; x_j, p_j ; \dots ; x_n, p_n],$$

with $x > 0$. Anti-squeezing occurs when x is replaced by $-x$, that is, when L is transformed into a lottery C given by

$$C = [x_1, p_1 ; \dots ; x_i - x, p ; x_i, p_i ; \dots ; x_j, p_j ; x_j + x, p ; \dots ; x_n, p_n].$$

Clearly, both squeezing and anti-squeezing preserve the mean. Squeezing and anti-squeezing are also supposed to preserve the initial ranking of outcomes. Note the generality of these transformations. Depending on the specification of x and p , a squeeze and an anti-squeeze can be interpreted both as a shift in outcomes and as a shift in probabilities.

In this section, we explicate the dual story in examples. Section 4 contains the general approach. We first return to the second order and consider an initial lottery $L^{(2)}$ given by¹¹

$$L^{(2)} = [1, 1/2 ; 2, 1/2].$$

¹¹The superscript ⁽²⁾ refers to “second order” and more generally the superscript ^(m) refers to “ m^{th} order”.

Now we transform the lottery $L^{(2)}$ into a lottery $D^{(2)}$ by squeezing. Specifically, we conduct the transformation

$$\mathcal{G}^{(2)}\left(L^{(2)}; 1, 2, x, -x, p\right),$$

where the first argument of $\mathcal{G}^{(2)}$ specifies the initial lottery, the next two arguments detail the outcomes that are affected by squeezing, the next two arguments specify the shifts in outcomes, and the last argument specifies the shift in probability. In $\mathcal{G}^{(2)}$ the good (a positive outcome shift) location-wise precedes the bad (a negative outcome shift). When $x = 1/M$, $M \geq 2$,¹² $p = 1/n$ and $n = 2$ the squeeze yields the new lottery $D^{(2)}$ given by

$$D^{(2)} = [1 + 1/M, 1/2 ; 2 - 1/M, 1/2].$$

An anti-squeeze of $L^{(2)}$ that is same-sized but opposite to the squeeze is achieved by the transformation

$$\mathcal{B}^{(2)}\left(L^{(2)}; 1, 2, -x, x, p\right),$$

where the bad (a negative outcome shift) now precedes the good (a positive outcome shift). This anti-squeeze generates $C^{(2)}$ given by

$$C^{(2)} = [1 - 1/M, 1/2 ; 2 + 1/M, 1/2].$$

See the illustration in Figure 1.


Clearly, under strong risk aversion, $D^{(2)} \succeq C^{(2)}$.¹³ These preferences correspond to $h'' \leq 0$ under DT and to $U'' \leq 0$ under the EU model. Indeed, squeezing and anti-squeezing are special cases of a mean preserving contraction and a mean preserving spread in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), and DT and EU are known to agree in their evaluation of a

¹²The condition on M guarantees that the squeeze does not change the initial ranking of outcomes.

¹³In order not to limit the generality of our approach, we usually don't compare the altered lotteries $C^{(2)}$ and $D^{(2)}$ to the initial lottery $L^{(2)}$ they are generated from; see also the next section. Indeed, making this comparison always possible would require imposing additional restrictions on the permitted squeezes and anti-squeezes. In specific cases, nevertheless, the comparison between $C^{(2)}$, $D^{(2)}$ and $L^{(2)}$ is possible. In fact, throughout this section, $D^{(m)} \succeq L^{(m)} \succeq C^{(m)}$ for DT DM's having probability weighting functions with higher order derivatives that alternate in sign. In the following sections we sometimes directly construct $D^{(m)}$ from $C^{(m)}$ for brevity and parsimony.

Figure 1: Squeezing and Anti-Squeezing at the Second Order

This figure plots the transformation from $L^{(2)}$ to $D^{(2)}$ (left panel) and from $L^{(2)}$ to $C^{(2)}$ (right panel), with $x_1 = 1$, $x_2 = 2$, and $p = 1/2$.



mean preserving contraction and a mean preserving spread.

Turning now to the third order, the agreement between DT and EU may collapse, as already anticipated in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The model free preferences based on the precedence relation towards good and bad coupled with the notions of squeezing and anti-squeezing are deployed as follows.¹⁴ We start from an initial lottery $L^{(3)}$ given by

$$L^{(3)} = [1, 1/3 ; 2, 1/3 ; 4, 1/3].$$

Then we generate $D^{(3)}$ as

$$D^{(3)} = [1 + 1/M, 1/3 ; 2 - 2/M, 1/3 ; 4 + 1/M, 1/3],$$

with $M \geq 3$. To obtain $D^{(3)}$ from $L^{(3)}$, we conduct the transformation


$$\mathcal{G}^{(3)} \left(L^{(3)}; (1, 2), (2, 4), (x, -x), (-x, x), p \right),$$

which on the worst two states of $L^{(3)}$ applies a squeeze of size $(x, -x)$, and on the best two states of $L^{(3)}$ performs an anti-squeeze of size $(-x, x)$, where we take in this case $x = 1/M$, $M \geq 3$, $p = 1/n$ and $n = 3$. In the transformation from $L^{(3)}$ to $D^{(3)}$, the good (a squeeze) precedes the bad (an anti-squeeze). To keep the required number of states as small as possible, for ease and parsimony of exposition, we consider in this illustration a lottery $L^{(3)}$ with only 3

¹⁴This is again an illustration. The general treatment is contained in Section 4.

Figure 2: Squeezing and Anti-Squeezing Sequences at the Third Order

This figure plots the transformation from $L^{(3)}$ to $D^{(3)}$ (left panel) and from $L^{(3)}$ to $C^{(3)}$ (right panel), with $x_1 = 1$, $x_2 = 2$, $x_3 = 4$, and $p = 1/3$.



states, having moreover equal probabilities of occurrence, and we squeeze and anti-squeeze at an overlapping state (that with outcome 2) and by the same amount. These restrictions are, however, not required for our general approach; see Section 4 for further details.

Similarly, we generate a lottery $C^{(3)}$ given by

$$C^{(3)} = [1 - 1/M, 1/3 ; 2 + 2/M, 1/3 ; 4 - 1/M, 1/3],$$

obtained from the initial lottery $L^{(3)}$ by the transformation

$$\mathcal{B}^{(3)} \left(L^{(3)}; (1, 2), (2, 4), (-x, x), (x, -x), p \right),$$

with $x = 1/M$, $M \geq 3$, $p = 1/n$ and $n = 3$, letting the bad (an anti-squeeze) precede the good (a squeeze). See the illustration in Figure 2.

As shown in Section 4, to which a precise statement of this result is deferred—see Theorems 4.1 and 4.2—, “dual prudence” (or “ $h''' \geq 0$ ”) corresponds to “ $D^{(3)} \succeq C^{(3)}$ ”. Both the well-known probability weighting function of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and that of Prelec (1998) exhibit $h''' \geq 0$ under the typical parameter sets implied by experiments.

It is very important to realize that there is no unanimity among EU maximizers with $U''' \geq 0$ on the comparison between $C^{(3)}$ and $D^{(3)}$. This is essentially so because these two lotteries with the same mean have different variances and skewnesses. Indeed, $\text{Var}[D^{(3)}] > \text{Var}[C^{(3)}]$ and

$\text{Skew}[D^{(3)}] > \text{Skew}[C^{(3)}]$. As a result, EU DM's who are relatively more (less) risk averse than prudent prefer $C^{(3)}$ ($D^{(3)}$). While our story of squeezing and anti-squeezing may yield different primal moments (variances in particular) for the lotteries that are compared, it preserves equality of the second dual moments. Indeed, one may verify that

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\min(D_1^{(3)}, D_2^{(3)}) \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[\min(C_1^{(3)}, C_2^{(3)}) \right].$$

This is the fundamental reason why EU and DT may diverge from the third order onwards.

We note that if we would have started from an initial lottery $\tilde{L}^{(3)}$ given by

$$\tilde{L}^{(3)} = [1, 1/3 ; 2, 1/3 ; 3, 1/3],$$

equality of the variances would have been preserved in the transformation to the corresponding $\tilde{D}^{(3)}$ and $\tilde{C}^{(3)}$. In this case both EU DM's with $U''' \geq 0$ and DT DM's with $h''' \geq 0$ would have preferred $\tilde{D}^{(3)}$ over $\tilde{C}^{(3)}$. That is, EU and DT may, but need not, diverge at the third order.

In order to interpret the sign of the fourth derivative of h we start from an expanded lottery $L^{(4)}$ given by

$$L^{(4)} = [1, 1/4 ; 2, 1/4 ; 4, 1/4 ; 7, 1/4].$$

Now on the worst three states of $L^{(4)}$ we conduct the beneficial transformation described at the third order, and on the best three states of $L^{(4)}$ we conduct exactly the opposite transformation. That is, we conduct the transformation

$$\mathcal{G}^{(4)} \left(L^{(4)}; (1, 2, 2, 4), (2, 4, 4, 7), (x, -x, -x, x), (-x, x, x, -x), p \right),$$

with in this case $x = 1/M$, $M \geq 4$, $p = 1/n$ and $n = 4$, so that we obtain a lottery $D^{(4)}$ given by

$$D^{(4)} = [1 + 1/M, 1/4 ; 2 - 3/M, 1/4 ; 4 + 3/M, 1/4 ; 7 - 1/M, 1/4].$$

Conversely, by letting the bad precede the good we generate

$$C^{(4)} = [1 - 1/M, 1/4 ; 2 + 3/M, 1/4 ; 4 - 3/M, 1/4 ; 7 + 1/M, 1/4].$$

In Section 4, we show that $D^{(4)}$ is unanimously preferred over $C^{(4)}$ by DT DM's with "dual temperance" (or " $h'''' \leq 0$ ")—see Theorems 4.4 and 4.5.

To see the implications of the dual story within the EU model, it is convenient to compare $D^{(4)}$ to $C^{(4)}$ when $M = 4$. While in this case $C^{(4)}$ and $D^{(4)}$ have the same mean and variance, one easily verifies that $D^{(4)}$ has both a smaller skewness and a smaller kurtosis than $C^{(4)}$. Hence, there cannot be unanimity among the prudent and temperate EU DM's about the appreciation of the two lotteries: some will prefer $D^{(4)}$ while others will prefer $C^{(4)}$, depending upon their relative degrees of prudence and temperance. This observation makes explicit the reason why at the fourth order EU and DT may (continue to) diverge: while the sequence of squeezing and anti-squeezing at the fourth order may produce different third primal moments for $C^{(4)}$ and $D^{(4)}$, it preserves the equality of the third dual moments, corroborating again their relevance for the dual story.

We finally note that the lotteries at the third and fourth orders are generated by simple iterations of the transformations relevant at the second and third orders, respectively. Hence, this analysis can be pursued up to arbitrary order to interpret the signs of the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function. We thus obtain, as in the Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) approach, a sequence of simple nested lotteries that yield now the appropriate interpretation of the signs of $h^{(m)}$.

4 Dual Risk Apportionment

In this section, we develop the dual story as illustrated in Section 3 in full generality. Throughout this section we consider n -state lotteries and assume all states to have equal probability of occurrence $1/n$, $n \in \mathbb{N}$. We permit that the increments in the outcomes when moving to an adjacent state are equal to zero. This can be interpreted to yield lotteries with unequal state

probabilities.

4.1 The Third Order: Dual Prudence

We start by providing a simple class of lottery pairs such that the direction of preference between these lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the third derivative of the probability weighting function under DT. Consider the transformations

$$\mathcal{G}^{(3)}(\cdot; (x_i, x_{i+j}), (x_k, x_{k+l}), (\delta, -\delta), (-\delta', \delta'), 1/n) \quad \text{and}$$

$$\mathcal{B}^{(3)}(\cdot; (x_{i'}, x_{i'+l}), (x_{k'}, x_{k'+j}), (-\delta', \delta'), (\delta, -\delta), 1/n), \quad j, l \geq 1, \quad i, i' < k, \quad i, i' < k',$$

with $\delta, \delta' \geq 0$. The acronyms “ \mathcal{G} ” and “ \mathcal{B} ” refer to “good” and “bad”. Upon conducting the transformations $\mathcal{G}^{(3)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(3)}$ to an arbitrarily given initial lottery that has at least three states such that the transformations are feasible, we generate $D^{(3)}$ and $C^{(3)}$, respectively. In $\mathcal{G}^{(3)}$ the squeeze precedes the anti-squeeze, while in $\mathcal{B}^{(3)}$ the anti-squeeze precedes the squeeze.

To emphasize the generality of these transformations, we note that: (i) δ and δ' may differ; (ii) j and l may differ; (iii) i and i' may differ, and k and k' may differ, hence the spacings $k - (i + j)$ and $k' - (i' + l)$ may differ; (iv) these spacings may be negative, so that the squeeze and the anti-squeeze partially overlap, but $i, i' < k$ and $i, i' < k'$. All these generalities are permitted as long as the ranking of outcomes remains unaffected by the squeezes and anti-squeezes and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative. These generalities are in part thanks to the fact that we don't compare the changed lotteries to the initial lottery they are generated from. Rather we compare two altered lotteries: one has the good precede the bad, the other the reverse.

We say that an individual is “dual prudent” if, for any such lottery pair $(C^{(3)}, D^{(3)})$, he prefers $D^{(3)}$ to $C^{(3)}$. The following theorem shows that within DT this is guaranteed by a positive sign of h''' . The individual's type of behavior corresponding to these lottery preferences, and their higher-order generalizations that we develop below, may be termed “dual risk apportionment”. Much like under primal risk apportionment, the apportionment of harms within a lottery mitigates the detrimental effects for such an individual.

Theorem 4.1 *If $C^{(3)}$ and $D^{(3)}$ are generated by the transformations described above, then $D^{(3)}$ is preferred (dispreferred) to $C^{(3)}$ by any DT DM with $h''' \geq 0$ ($h''' \leq 0$).*

In the remainder of this subsection, we consider a parsimonious subclass of lottery pairs $C^{(3)}$ and $D^{(3)}$ that turns out to be already sufficient for the purpose of signing h''' . Let $n \geq 3$ and consider

$$C_n^{(3)} = [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\ \mathbf{x_{j+1}, 1/n} ; \mathbf{x_{j+2}, 1/n} ; \mathbf{x_{j+3}, 1/n} ; \\ x_{j+4}, 1/n; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n].$$

The three states in bold need to be present for any given $n(\geq 3)$, the remaining states are added arbitrarily until the state probabilities sum up to 1. The increments in the outcomes when moving to an adjacent higher state of $C_n^{(3)}$ are allowed to be arbitrarily non-negative and state-dependent, as long as the squeezes and anti-squeezes performed below do not change the ranking of outcomes.¹⁵

Then, we (directly) construct $D_n^{(3)}$ from $C_n^{(3)}$ as follows:

$$D_n^{(3)} = [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\ \mathbf{x_{j+1} + 1/M, 1/n} ; \mathbf{x_{j+2} - 2/M, 1/n} ; \mathbf{x_{j+3} + 1/M, 1/n} ; \\ x_{j+4}, 1/n; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n].$$

Clearly, $C_n^{(3)}$ and $D_n^{(3)}$ occur as a subclass of $C^{(3)}$ and $D^{(3)}$. To see this, consider an initial lottery $L_n^{(3)}$ given by

$$L_n^{(3)} = [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\ \mathbf{x_{j+1} + 1/(2M), 1/n} ; \mathbf{x_{j+2} - 1/M, 1/n} ; \mathbf{x_{j+3} + 1/(2M), 1/n} ; \\ x_{j+4}, 1/n; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n],$$

¹⁵This is accomplished by restricting M in the squeezes and anti-squeezes explicated below accordingly.

and generate $D_n^{(3)}$ and $C_n^{(3)}$ by conducting the transformations

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{G}^{(3)} \left(L_n^{(3)}; (x_{j+1} + 1/(2M), x_{j+2} - 1/M), (x_{j+2} - 1/M, x_{j+3} + 1/(2M)), \right. \\ \left. (1/(2M), -1/(2M)), (-1/(2M), 1/(2M)), 1/n \right) \quad \text{and} \\ \mathcal{B}^{(3)} \left(L_n^{(3)}; (x_{j+1} + 1/(2M), x_{j+2} - 1/M), (x_{j+2} - 1/M, x_{j+3} + 1/(2M)), \right. \\ \left. (-1/(2M), 1/(2M)), (1/(2M), -1/(2M)), 1/n \right), \end{aligned}$$

respectively. To keep the required number of states as small as possible and enhance parsimony, sufficient for our purpose of signing h''' , we squeeze and anti-squeeze at an overlapping state, just like in Section 3.

The following theorem shows that within DT the preference towards the class of lottery pairs $D_n^{(3)}$ and $C_n^{(3)}$ signs h''' :

Theorem 4.2 *If, for any $n \geq 3$, a DT DM prefers (disprefers) $D_n^{(3)}$ to $C_n^{(3)}$, then $h''' \geq 0$ ($h''' \leq 0$).*

Remark 4.3 *Consider a setting in which the initial lotteries have not only equal state probabilities but also equal distances between outcomes of those states where shifting occurs. Then dual prudence corresponds to accepting a change in distribution that shifts two extreme outcomes upwards by δ and shifts an intermediate outcome downwards by 2δ ; while primal prudence corresponds to accepting a change in distribution that shifts the probability of two extreme outcome states upwards (i.e., to a higher outcome state) by a distance δ and shifts the same probability of an intermediate outcome state downwards (i.e., to a lower outcome state) by a distance 2δ . Thus we observe a dual relationship: in the former change in distribution, outcomes are shifted, while in the latter, probabilities are shifted. Both changes in distribution—the shifts in outcomes and the shifts in probabilities—preserve the first and second primal and dual moments in this setting.*

4.2 The Fourth Order: Dual Temperance

Next, we provide a simple class of lottery pairs such that the direction of preference between these lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the fourth derivative of the probability weighting function under DT. Consider the transformations

$$\mathcal{G}^{(4)}(\cdot; (x_i, x_{i+j}, x_{i+k}, x_{i+k+j}), (x_q, x_{q+r}, x_{q+s}, x_{q+s+r}), (\delta, -\delta, -\delta, \delta), (-\delta', \delta', \delta', -\delta'), 1/n) \quad \text{and}$$

$$\mathcal{B}^{(4)}(\cdot; (x_{i'}, x_{i'+r}, x_{i'+s}, x_{i'+r+s}), (x_{q'}, x_{q'+j}, x_{q'+k}, x_{q'+k+j}), (-\delta', \delta', \delta', -\delta'), (\delta, -\delta, -\delta, \delta), 1/n),$$

$$j, r \geq 1, \quad k \geq j, \quad s \geq r, \quad i, i' < q, \quad i, i' < q',$$

with $\delta, \delta' \geq 0$. Upon conducting the transformations $\mathcal{G}^{(4)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(4)}$ to an arbitrarily given initial lottery that has at least four states such that the transformations are feasible, we generate $D^{(4)}$ and $C^{(4)}$, respectively. We note that $\mathcal{G}^{(4)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(4)}$ can both be interpreted as concatenations (i.e., subsequent applications) of simple transformations $\mathcal{G}^{(3)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(3)}$ that each has its own same-sized but exactly opposite and symmetric equal-states-spaced outcome shifts. Thus, we define the fourth order transformations by simple iterations of the third order ones.

To emphasize the generality of these transformations, we note that: (i) δ and δ' may differ; (ii) j, k, r and s may differ; (iii) i and i' may differ, and q and q' may differ, hence the spacings $q - (i + k + j)$ and $q' - (i' + s + r)$ may differ; (iv) these spacings may be negative, but $i, i' < q$ and $i, i' < q'$. All these generalities are permitted as long as the ranking of outcomes remains unaffected and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative.

We say that an individual is “dual temperate” if, for any such lottery pair $(C^{(4)}, D^{(4)})$, he prefers $D^{(4)}$ to $C^{(4)}$. The following theorem shows that within DT this is guaranteed by a negative sign of h'''' .

Theorem 4.4 *If $C^{(4)}$ and $D^{(4)}$ are generated by the transformations described above, then $D^{(4)}$ is preferred (dispreferred) to $C^{(4)}$ by any DT DM with $h'''' \leq 0$ ($h'''' \geq 0$).*

As in Section 4.1, let us in the remainder of this subsection consider a parsimonious subclass of lottery pairs $C^{(4)}$ and $D^{(4)}$, already sufficient for our purpose of signing h'''' . Let $n \geq 4$ and

consider

$$C_n^{(4)} = [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\ \mathbf{x}_{j+1}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+2}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+3}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+4}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \\ x_{j+5}, 1/n ; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n].$$

The four states in bold need to be present for any given $n(\geq 4)$, the remaining states are added arbitrarily until the state probabilities sum up to 1. The increments in the outcomes when moving to an adjacent higher state of $C_n^{(4)}$ are again allowed to be arbitrarily non-negative and state-dependent, as long as the transformations conducted below do not change the ranking of outcomes.¹⁶

Then, we (directly) construct $D_n^{(4)}$ from $C_n^{(4)}$ as follows:

$$D_n^{(4)} = [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\ \mathbf{x}_{j+1} + \mathbf{1/M}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+2} - \mathbf{3/M}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+3} + \mathbf{3/M}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+4} - \mathbf{1/M}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \\ x_{j+5}, 1/n ; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n].$$

Clearly, $C_n^{(4)}$ and $D_n^{(4)}$ occur as a subclass of $C^{(4)}$ and $D^{(4)}$. To see this, consider an initial lottery $L_n^{(4)}$ given by

$$L_n^{(4)} = [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\ \mathbf{x}_{j+1} + \mathbf{1/(2M)}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+2} - \mathbf{3/(2M)}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \mathbf{x}_{j+3} + \mathbf{3/(2M)}, \mathbf{1/n} ; \\ \mathbf{x}_{j+4} - \mathbf{1/(2M)}, \mathbf{1/n} ; x_{j+5}, 1/n ; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n],$$

¹⁶This is accomplished by restricting M in the transformations explicated below accordingly.

and generate $D_n^{(4)}$ and $C_n^{(4)}$ by conducting the transformations

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{G}^{(4)} \left(L_n^{(4)}; (x_{j+1} + 1/(2M), x_{j+2} - 3/(2M), x_{j+2} - 3/(2M), x_{j+3} + 3/(2M)), \right. \\ \left. (x_{j+2} - 3/(2M), x_{j+3} + 3/(2M), x_{j+3} + 3/(2M), x_{j+4} - 1/(2M)), \right. \\ \left. (1/(2M), -1/(2M), -1/(2M), 1/(2M)), (-1/(2M), 1/(2M), 1/(2M), -1/(2M)), 1/n \right), \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{B}^{(4)} \left(L_n^{(4)}; (x_{j+1} + 1/(2M), x_{j+2} - 3/(2M), x_{j+2} - 3/(2M), x_{j+3} + 3/(2M)), \right. \\ \left. (x_{j+2} - 3/(2M), x_{j+3} + 3/(2M), x_{j+3} + 3/(2M), x_{j+4} - 1/(2M)), \right. \\ \left. (-1/(2M), 1/(2M), 1/(2M), -1/(2M)), (1/(2M), -1/(2M), -1/(2M), 1/(2M)), 1/n \right), \end{aligned}$$

respectively. To keep the required number of states as small as possible and enhance parsimony, sufficient for our purpose of signing h'''' , we again conduct transformations at overlapping states, just like in Section 4.1 and Section 3.

The following theorem shows that within DT the preference towards the class of lottery pairs $D_n^{(4)}$ and $C_n^{(4)}$ signs h'''' :

Theorem 4.5 *If, for any $n \geq 4$, a DT DM prefers (disprefers) $D_n^{(4)}$ to $C_n^{(4)}$, then $h'''' \leq 0$ ($h'''' \geq 0$).*

4.3 The m^{th} Order

In this section, we systematically construct simple nested classes of lottery pairs such that the direction of preference between these lottery pairs is equivalent to signing the m^{th} derivative of the probability weighting function under DT. We start at the second order and proceed to construct all higher orders of dual risk apportionment by simple iteration, as follows. Consider the transformations

$$\mathcal{G}^{(2)} \left(\cdot ; x_i, x_j, \delta, -\delta', 1/n \right) \quad \text{and} \quad \mathcal{B}^{(2)} \left(\cdot ; x_{i'}, x_{j'}, -\delta', \delta, 1/n \right), \quad i, i' < j, \quad i, i' < j',$$

with $\delta, \delta' \geq 0$. Taking the $(m - 1)^{\text{th}}$ order as a starting point, we construct the class of lottery pairs for the m^{th} order in two steps. Let $n \geq m$. Then:

- (i) Concatenate (i.e., subsequently apply) a transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$, with same-sized but exactly opposite (in sign) and symmetric equal-states-spaced outcome shifts, and a transformation $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$, with its own same-sized but exactly opposite and symmetric equal-states-spaced outcome shifts, where the worst state affected by $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$ precedes the worst state affected by $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$ by at least one state. This generates the transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m)}$. Similarly, concatenate a translation to the left of the transformation $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$ and a translation to the right of the transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$, where the worst state affected by the translation to the left of $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$ now precedes the worst state affected by the translation to the right of $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$ by at least one state. This generates $\mathcal{B}^{(m)}$.
- (ii) Apply $\mathcal{G}^{(m)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(m)}$ to an arbitrarily given n -state initial lottery. Conducting the transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m)}$ generates $D^{(m)}$, while conducting the transformation $\mathcal{B}^{(m)}$ generates $C^{(m)}$.

In the transformations to $D^{(m)}$ and $C^{(m)}$ we require that the ranking of outcomes remains unaffected and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative.

Then, we state the following theorem:

Theorem 4.6 *Let $m \geq 2$. If $C^{(m)}$ and $D^{(m)}$ are generated by the transformations described above, then $D^{(m)}$ is preferred (dispreferred) to $C^{(m)}$ by any DT DM with $(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \geq 0$ ($(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \leq 0$).*

Just like in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 we consider henceforth parsimonious subclasses of lottery pairs $C^{(m)}$ and $D^{(m)}$ that are already sufficient for signing $h^{(m)}$. We start at the second order and proceed by simple iteration. Let $n \geq m \geq 2$ and consider

$$\begin{aligned}
 C_n^{(m)} = & [x_1, 1/n ; \dots ; x_j, 1/n ; \\
 & \mathbf{x}_{j+1}, \mathbf{1}/\mathbf{n} ; \dots ; \mathbf{x}_{j+m}, \mathbf{1}/\mathbf{n} ; \\
 & x_{j+m+1}, 1/n; \dots ; \cdot, 1/n].
 \end{aligned}$$

The m states in bold need to be present for any $n(\geq m)$, the remaining states are added arbitrarily until the state probabilities sum up to 1. The increments in the outcomes when moving to an adjacent higher state of $C_n^{(m)}$ are allowed to be arbitrarily non-negative and state-dependent, as long as the transformations conducted below do not change the ranking of outcomes. Taking the $(m - 1)^{\text{th}}$ order as a starting point, we construct the class of lottery pairs for the m^{th} order in two steps:

- (i) Concatenate a transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$, with same-sized but exactly opposite (in sign) and single-state-spaced outcome shifts, and a transformation $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$, with same-sized, equal to $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$, but exactly opposite and single-state-spaced outcome shifts, where the worst state affected by $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$ precedes the worst state affected by $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$ by exactly one state. This generates the transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m)}$. Similarly, concatenate a translation to the left by one state of the transformation $\mathcal{B}^{(m-1)}$ and a translation to the right by one state of the transformation $\mathcal{G}^{(m-1)}$. This generates $\mathcal{B}^{(m)}$. (For $m = 2$, we set $\mathcal{G}^{(2)}(\cdot; x_{j+1}, x_{j+2}, \delta, -\delta, 1/n)$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(2)}(\cdot; x_{j+2}, x_{j+3}, -\delta, \delta, 1/n)$, $\delta > 0$.)
- (ii) Generate $D_n^{(m)}$ by applying $\mathcal{G}^{(m)}$ to $C_n^{(m)}$.

In the transformations from $C_n^{(m)}$ to $D_n^{(m)}$ we require that the ranking of outcomes remains unaffected and the outcomes of the resulting lotteries remain non-negative. For $m \geq 3$, we perform our sequences of squeezes and anti-squeezes at overlapping states to keep the required number of states minimal. This yields a parsimonious approach already sufficient for signing $h^{(m)}$.

Finally, the following theorem shows that within DT the preference towards the class of lottery pairs $D_n^{(m)}$ and $C_n^{(m)}$ signs $h^{(m)}$:

Theorem 4.7 *Let $m \geq 2$. If, for any $n \geq m$, a DT DM prefers (disprefers) $D_n^{(m)}$ to $C_n^{(m)}$, then $(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \geq 0$ ($(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \leq 0$).*

5 Economic Applications

5.1 Portfolio Choice with Derivatives

Consider a DT investor with initial sure wealth w_0 . Suppose that he allocates an amount α to a risky asset (the “stock”) and an amount $w_0 - \alpha$ to a risk-free asset (the “bond”). The bond (stock) earns a sure (risky) return of r (R) per unit invested. Assume that r and R are independent of the amounts invested. The investor aims to determine the optimal amount α^* . Because $(w_0 - \alpha)(1 + r) + \alpha(1 + R) = w_0(1 + r) + \alpha(R - r)$ and the DT evaluation is translation invariant and positively homogeneous, his problem reads:

$$\arg \max_{\alpha} \{ \alpha(V[R] - r) \}. \quad (5.1)$$

We add the constraint $0 \leq \alpha \leq w_0$. It readily follows that the optimal solution α^* is a corner solution.

Suppose $V[R] < r$. Then the optimal solution is $\alpha^* = 0$. In this case, the investor fully invests in the bond. Now imagine that the investor is offered an improvement to the distribution of the risky return. In particular, he is offered the possibility of supplementing the stock with derivative products on the stock that have zero expected value at zero cost. The derivative products are selected by applying the dual story such that they induce, through squeezing and anti-squeezing, an m^{th} order improvement of R , with $m \geq 2$. The return of the risky portfolio of stock and derivatives jointly is denoted by \bar{R} . (We provide details on the derivative products shortly.)

Then two cases are possible: (i) If $V[\bar{R}] \leq r$, full investment in the bond remains optimal. (ii) If the improvement is sufficiently large so that $V[\bar{R}] > r$, the DT investor will shift from one corner solution (full investment in the bond, i.e., $\alpha^* = 0$) to the other corner solution (full investment in the risky portfolio, i.e., $\alpha^* = w_0$).

To illustrate these m^{th} order improvements, suppose for ease of exposition that $r \equiv 0$. Consider the second order first. Assume that the stock price takes the values 1 and 3 each with probability 1/2. Invoking the dual story, we find that a long position in a put option combined

with a short position in a call option, each with a strike price of 2 such that the joint expected value is zero, improves the attractiveness of the risky portfolio (\bar{R} versus R) whenever $h'' \leq 0$. Indeed, the difference between \bar{R} and R can in this case be seen as the result of squeezing and anti-squeezing.¹⁷ As visualized in the top left panel of Figure 3, this combination of long put and short call provides a hedge against adverse stock scenarios, which is financed by giving up upward potential.

Next, consider the third order. Assume now that the stock price takes the values $\{1, 3, 5, 7\}$ each with probability $1/4$. Then, deploying the dual story, one may readily verify that a so-called “straddle” option at stock price 4 such that the expected value is zero, improves the attractiveness of the risky portfolio (\bar{R} versus R) whenever $h''' \geq 0$. As visualized in the top right panel of Figure 3, the straddle pays off in bad stock scenarios and in good stock scenarios, but generates losses in intermediate stock scenarios.¹⁸ Because the straddle increases not only the skewness but also the variance of the risky portfolio, there would be no unanimity for the straddle supplement under EU, contrary to under DT.

¹⁷Throughout this section the risky stock price $S_0(1 + R)$, with S_0 the initial stock price, plays the role of the lotteries $C^{(m)}$ encountered in the dual story, while the stock-and-derivatives portfolio price $S_0(1 + \bar{R})$ plays the role of the lotteries $D^{(m)}$. The derivative supplements directly generate the improvement \bar{R} from R . Specifically, $R = (C^{(m)} - S_0)/S_0$ and $\bar{R} = (D^{(m)} - S_0)/S_0$. At the second order,

$$C^{(2)} = [1, 1/2 ; 3, 1/2] \quad \text{and} \quad D^{(2)} = [2, 1/2 ; 2, 1/2].$$

Of course, $C^{(2)}$ and $D^{(2)}$ may be generated from a common initial lottery $L^{(2)} = [3/2, 1/2 ; 5/2, 1/2]$ by squeezing and anti-squeezing, that is, by the transformations

$$D^{(2)} = \mathcal{G}^{(2)} \left(L^{(2)}; 3/2, 5/2, 1/2, -1/2, 1/2 \right) \quad \text{and} \quad C^{(2)} = \mathcal{B}^{(2)} \left(L^{(2)}; 3/2, 5/2, -1/2, 1/2, 1/2 \right).$$

¹⁸At the third order, $R = (C^{(3)} - S_0)/S_0$ and $\bar{R} = (D^{(3)} - S_0)/S_0$, where


$$C^{(3)} = [1, 1/4 ; 3, 1/4 ; 5, 1/4 ; 7, 1/4] \quad \text{and} \quad D^{(3)} = [2, 1/4 ; 2, 1/4 ; 4, 1/4 ; 8, 1/4].$$

They can be generated from an initial lottery $L^{(3)} = [3/2, 1/4 ; 5/2, 1/4 ; 9/2, 1/4 ; 15/2, 1/4]$ by the transformations

$$\begin{aligned} D^{(3)} &= \mathcal{G}^{(3)} \left(L^{(3)}; (3/2, 5/2), (9/2, 15/2), (1/2, -1/2), (-1/2, 1/2), (1/4) \right), \\ C^{(3)} &= \mathcal{B}^{(3)} \left(L^{(3)}; (3/2, 5/2), (9/2, 15/2), (-1/2, 1/2), (1/2, -1/2), (1/4) \right). \end{aligned}$$

Figure 3: Optimal Portfolio Choice with Derivatives.

This figure plots the payoff functions of the derivative products to supplement the stock inducing an m^{th} order improvement, $m = 2, 3, 4$. At each order, the derivative products have zero (joint) expected value. At the second order (top left panel), we supplement the stock with a long position in a put option (blue, solid) and a short position in a call option (green, dashed), both with a strike price of 2. At the third order (top right panel), we enter into a straddle option (blue) at stock price 4. Finally, at the fourth order (bottom panel), we add a long straddle at stock price 4 (blue) and a short straddle at stock price 12 (green, dashed). Both the stock price itself and the stock-and-derivatives portfolio price can at each order be generated from a common initial lottery (in the form of a stock-and-derivatives portfolio) represented by the grey dotted lines through (a sequence of) squeezes and anti-squeezes represented by the solid and dashed arrows, respectively, according to the dual story; see also footnotes 17 and 18.



Finally, at the fourth order, assume the stock price takes the values $\{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15\}$ each with probability $1/8$. Then, the dual story implies that a long straddle at stock price 4 combined with a short straddle at stock price 12, with joint expected value equal zero, improves the attractiveness of the risky portfolio provided $h''' \leq 0$. This combination of a long and short straddle, visualized in the last panel of Figure 3, is a popular and simple case of a so-called “volatility spread”.¹⁹

We thus find that an m^{th} order (dual) improvement of the risky asset’s return distribution never reduces the demand for the risky asset when the successive derivatives of the probability weighting function alternate in sign. This stands in sharp contrast to the familiar results under EU, where an m^{th} order (primal) improvement of R has ambiguous demand effects, even for $m \geq 1$. Indeed, to obtain the natural result that such improvements induce a higher demand for the risky asset under EU, additional non-trivial conditions need to be imposed (see Section 9.3 of Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) and Gollier (1995) for details).²⁰

5.2 Self-Protection with Background Risk

In this section, we consider a DT DM with initial sure wealth w_0 who faces the risk of losing the monetary amount $\ell > 0$. The probability of occurrence of the loss, p , depends on the self-protection²¹ effort, e , exerted by the DM. In particular, $p(e)$ is decreasing in e . Effort is measured in monetary equivalents. The DM aims to determine the optimal level of effort e^* that maximizes his DT evaluation.

We analyze this problem in the presence of an independent background risk. This background risk may e.g., be due to the risk of holding risky financial assets or to uncertain labor income. The sign of h''' appears to play an essential role in this self-protection problem with background risk. Hence, while under EU the a priori validity of $U''' \geq 0$ is connected to a savings decision (Kimball (1990)), we show that under DT the a priori validity of $h''' \geq 0$ may be linked to a self-protection problem.

With an independent binary background risk taking the value $\pm\varepsilon$, $\varepsilon > 0$, each with prob-

¹⁹The payoffs of the long and short straddle are digitally set to 0 at stock price 8 for simplicity.

²⁰See also the analysis of Dittmar (2002) in the EU model.

²¹Adopting the terminology of Ehrlich and Becker (1972).

ability $1/2$, the self-protection problem can be represented by the following 4-state lottery $S(e)$:

$$S(e) = [w_0 - \ell - \varepsilon - e, p(e)/2 ; w_0 - \ell + \varepsilon - e, p(e)/2 ; \\ w_0 - \varepsilon - e, (1 - p(e))/2 ; w_0 + \varepsilon - e, (1 - p(e))/2],$$

assuming $2\varepsilon < \ell$. If $2\varepsilon > \ell$, the middle two states of S change places. The DT DM solves:

$$\arg \max_e \{V [S(e)]\}. \quad (5.2)$$

We assume throughout that V is concave in e .²²

If $2\varepsilon < \ell$,

$$V [S(e)] = h(p(e)/2)(w_0 - \ell - \varepsilon - e) + (h(p(e)) - h(p(e)/2))(w_0 - \ell + \varepsilon - e) \\ + (h((1 + p(e))/2) - h(p(e)))(w_0 - \varepsilon - e) \\ + (1 - h((1 + p(e))/2))(w_0 + \varepsilon - e),$$

and the first-order condition for optimality reads

$$\frac{dV [S(e)]}{de} = (p'(e)/2)h'(p(e)/2) ((w_0 - \ell - \varepsilon - e) - (w_0 - \ell + \varepsilon - e)) \\ + p'(e)h'(p(e)) ((w_0 - \ell + \varepsilon - e) - (w_0 - \varepsilon - e)) \\ + (p'(e)/2)h'((1 + p(e))/2) ((w_0 - \varepsilon - e) - (w_0 + \varepsilon - e)) \\ - 1 = 0.$$

After obvious simplifications, we obtain

$$p'(e)\varepsilon (-h'(p(e)/2) + 2h'(p(e)) - h'((1 + p(e))/2)) - p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0. \quad (5.3)$$

²²Conditions guaranteeing this follow from analyzing the second-order condition and depend upon the interplay between the functions h and p . Sufficient, but not necessary, conditions include: (i) $h'' \geq 0$ and $p'' \geq 0$; (ii) $h'' < 0$ and p is sufficiently convex; (iii) h is inverse S-shaped and p is sufficiently convex.

We note that in the absence of any background risk, i.e., when $\varepsilon = 0$, the first-order condition reduces to

$$-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0. \quad (5.4)$$

Now assume first, like in Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) for EU, that $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) = 1/2$. This means that the DT DM optimally selects an effort level e such that the probability of the occurrence of a loss is $1/2$, in the absence of background risk. Under this assumption, we find from (5.3) that the impact of the background risk is linked to the sign of

$$-h'(1/4) + 2h'(1/2) - h'(3/4) = (h'(1/2) - h'(1/4)) - (h'(3/4) - h'(1/2)). \quad (5.5)$$

If the sign of h''' is positive, then (5.5) is negative, and note that $p'(e)\varepsilon$ is negative, too. Therefore, and in view of the concavity of V with respect to e , the introduction of a background risk in this setting stimulates self-protection provided the DT DM is dual prudent.

Next, consider the case $2\varepsilon > \ell$. In this case,

$$\begin{aligned} V[S(e)] &= h(p(e)/2)(w_0 - \ell - \varepsilon - e) + (h(1/2) - h(p(e)/2))(w_0 - \varepsilon - e) \\ &\quad + (h((1 + p(e))/2) - h(1/2))(w_0 - \ell + \varepsilon - e) \\ &\quad + (1 - h((1 + p(e))/2))(w_0 + \varepsilon - e), \end{aligned}$$

and the first-order condition is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dV[S(e)]}{de} &= (p'(e)/2)h'(p(e)/2)((w_0 - \ell - \varepsilon - e) - (w_0 - \varepsilon - e)) \\ &\quad + (p'(e)/2)h'((1 + p(e))/2)((w_0 - \ell + \varepsilon - e) - (w_0 + \varepsilon - e)) \\ &\quad - 1 = 0, \end{aligned}$$

which, after obvious simplifications, reduces to

$$-(1/2)p'(e)\ell (h'(p(e)/2) + h'((1 + p(e))/2)) - 1 = 0. \quad (5.6)$$

Recall that in the absence of any background risk, the first-order condition equals (5.4). Hence, noting that the difference between the left-hand side of (5.6) and the left-hand side of (5.4) equals

$$-(1/2)p'(e)\ell (h'(p(e)/2) - 2h'(p(e)) + h'((1 + p(e))/2)), \quad (5.7)$$

and maintaining the assumption that $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) = 1/2$, we find that the impact of the background risk is again linked to the sign of (5.5) which, in turn, depends on the sign of h''' .

Thus, under the maintained assumption that $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) = 1/2$, $h''' \geq 0$ guarantees that the marginal benefit of self-protection increases upon the introduction of an independent background risk. Therefore, the background risk stimulates self-protection under dual prudence.²³

Now suppose $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) \neq 1/2$. In particular, suppose $2\varepsilon < \ell$, and $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) < 1/2$. The introduction of the background risk is then linked to the sign of

$$\begin{aligned} & -h'(p(e)/2) + 2h'(p(e)) - h'((1 + p(e))/2) \\ & = [h'(p(e)) - h'(p(e)/2)] - [h'((1 + p(e))/2) - h'(1/2)] - [h'(1/2) - h'(p(e))]. \end{aligned}$$

Under concavity of h' , $[h'(p(e)) - h'(p(e)/2)] - [h'((1 + p(e))/2) - h'(1/2)] \geq 0$. Furthermore, under concavity of h , $-[h'(1/2) - h'(p(e))] \geq 0$. So, if $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) < 1/2$, concavity of h and h' leads (when multiplied by $p'(e)\varepsilon$) to a negative impact in the first-order condition (5.3), hence a reduction of effort, in view of the concavity of V .

Next, with $2\varepsilon < \ell$, suppose $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) > 1/2$. The introduction of

²³There is a difference between the two cases. When $2\varepsilon < \ell$, the convexity of h' adds a marginal benefit that depends on the size of ε compared to the situation of no background risk; cf. (5.3). When $2\varepsilon > \ell$, the convexity of h' adds a marginal benefit that is independent of ε but depends on the size of ℓ compared to the situation of no background risk; cf. (5.7).

the background risk is then linked to the sign of

$$\begin{aligned}
& -h'(p(e)/2) + 2h'(p(e)) - h'((1+p(e))/2) \\
& = [h'(1/2) - h'(p(e)/2)] - [h'((1+p(e))/2) - h'(p(e))] - [h'(1/2) - h'(p(e))].
\end{aligned}$$

Under convexity of h' , $[h'(1/2) - h'(p(e)/2)] - [h'((1+p(e))/2) - h'(p(e))] \leq 0$. Furthermore, under concavity of h , $-[h'(1/2) - h'(p(e))] \leq 0$. So, if $-p'(e)h'(p(e))\ell - 1 = 0$ when $p(e) > 1/2$, concavity of h and convexity of h' lead to a positive impact in the first-order condition (5.3), hence an increase in effort. The case $2\varepsilon > \ell$ follows similarly, in view of (5.7).

6 Conclusion

Starting with Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980), many papers have been devoted to an interpretation of the signs of the successive derivatives of the utility function within the EU model.

In this paper we have developed a model free story of preferences towards particular nested classes of lottery pairs that is appropriate to satisfy the specific requirements of the DT model. The story yields an intuitive interpretation, and full characterization, of the dual counterparts of such concepts as prudence and temperance. The direction of preference between the nested lottery pairs that are provided by the story is equivalent to signing the m^{th} derivative of the probability weighting function within DT.

We have analyzed implications of our results for portfolio choice, which appear to stand in sharp contrast to familiar implications under the EU model. We have also shown that, where the sign of the third derivative of the utility function is connected to a savings problem, the sign of the third derivative of the probability weighting function may be naturally linked to a self-protection problem.

Because the primal and dual stories have several aspects in common, some of the implications of the primal story can potentially be extended to a dual world. For instance, because it is also simple, the dual story should be as amenable to experimentation as the primal story.

Another promising route for future research is that the dual story can serve as a building block on the basis of which it should be possible to obtain related interpretations for more general models of choice under risk (and ambiguity). Indeed, now that the dual story has been told, and the implications of the primal story for DT have been understood, future research can develop an interpretation to the signs of the successive derivatives of both the utility function and the probability weighting function in the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model of Quiggin (1982) and in prospect theory of Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For example, one may verify that the direction of preference between the *intersection* of lottery pairs generated by primal and dual risk apportionment signs the successive derivatives of the utility and probability weighting functions *jointly* under RDU. This would provide a test for the null hypothesis that both $U^{(3)} \geq 0$ and $h^{(3)} \geq 0$ in the RDU environment, as is often assumed in parametric specifications of the utility and probability weighting functions. Furthermore, subsets of lottery pairs generated by dual risk apportionment that share the same final wealth outcomes can be used to test the null hypothesis that (only) $h^{(3)} \geq 0$ in the RDU setting.

As such, this paper represents a first step, and paves new ways, towards the development of higher order risk attitudes in non-EU theories, as explicitly desired by Deck and Schlesinger (2010).

Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Proposition 2.1. Let $h(p) = \alpha p - \beta p^2$. Note that $h(0) = 0$. To have $h(1) = 1$, $\alpha - \beta = 1$ should hold. Hence, $h(p) = (1 + \beta)p - \beta p^2$, so that $h'(p) = 1 + \beta - 2\beta p$. To have $h'(1) \geq 0$ (hence $h'(p) \geq 0$ whenever $h''(p) \leq 0$), $\beta \leq 1$ should hold. Furthermore, $h''(p) = -2\beta$ so $h'' \leq 0$ if $\beta \geq 0$. In sum, $0 \leq \beta \leq 1$ and $\alpha = 1 + \beta$. With such a probability weighting function,

$$V[A] = ((1/4)(1 + \beta) - (1/16)\beta)0 + (1 - (1/4)(1 + \beta) + (1/16)\beta)2 = 3/2 - (3/8)\beta.$$

$$V[B] = ((3/4)(1 + \beta) - (9/16)\beta)1 + (1 - (3/4)(1 + \beta) + (9/16)\beta)3 = 3/2 - (3/8)\beta.$$

□

Proof of Proposition 2.3. With a probability weighting function that satisfies the same properties as in the proof of Proposition 2.1,

$$\begin{aligned} V[\tilde{A}] &= ((1/4)(1 + \beta) - (1/16)\beta)2 \\ &\quad + (((1/2)(1 + \beta) - (1/4)\beta) - ((1/4)(1 + \beta) - (1/16)\beta))6 \\ &\quad + (1 - ((1/2)(1 + \beta) - (1/4)\beta))10 = 7 - (7/4)\beta. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} V[\tilde{B}] &= ((1/2)(1 + \beta) - (1/4)\beta)4 \\ &\quad + (((3/4)(1 + \beta) - (9/16)\beta) - ((1/2)(1 + \beta) - (1/4)\beta))8 \\ &\quad + (1 - ((3/4)(1 + \beta) - (9/16)\beta))12 = 7 - (7/4)\beta. \end{aligned}$$

□

Proof of Theorem 2.5. It is straightforward to verify that if $h(p) = p$, $0 \leq p \leq 1$, then a zero-mean decrease in risk, whether shifted or not, leaves the DT evaluation, which simplifies to an expected value evaluation when $h(p) = p$, unchanged. This proves the “if” part.

We now prove the “only if” part. For this purpose, we restrict attention to a simple subclass of shifts of decreases in risk, inspired by the analysis in Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schneider (1995) and the Pigou-Dalton transfers analyzed by Chateauneuf, Gajdos and Wilthien (2002). We consider n -state risks A with equal state probabilities where for some positive integers

$1 \leq i, j, k, l \leq n$, with $i < j, k < l$, and $\varepsilon > 0$,

$$x_j - x_i = x_k - x_l, \quad x_i + \varepsilon \leq x_{i+1}, \quad x_{j-1} \leq x_j - \varepsilon, \quad x_k + \varepsilon \leq x_{k+1}, \quad x_{l-1} \leq x_l - \varepsilon.$$

We let $t = x_k - x_i$, and consider decreases in risk, yielding G_0 , and shifts thereof, yielding G_t , by the mean preserving contractions specified as

$$H(x) = -\frac{1}{n}1_{\{x_k \leq x < x_{k+\varepsilon}\}} + \frac{1}{n}1_{\{x_{l-\varepsilon} \leq x < x_l\}}, \quad H(x+t) = -\frac{1}{n}1_{\{x_i \leq x < x_{i+\varepsilon}\}} + \frac{1}{n}1_{\{x_{j-\varepsilon} \leq x < x_j\}}.$$

We start by proving that requiring $V[G_t] - V[G_0] \geq 0$ implies $h'' \geq 0$. Let $1 \leq a, b, a', b' \leq n = bb'cd$, $a, b, a', b', c, d \in \mathbb{N}^*$, with $a < b$, $a' < b'$, $a'/b' < a/b$, and $c > 2$. Now set

$$i/n = \left(1 - \frac{a}{b}\right) \left(1 - \frac{2}{c}\right), \quad j/n = \left(1 - \frac{a}{b}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{c}\right), \quad k/n = \left(1 - \frac{a}{b}\right), \quad l/n = \left(1 - \frac{a'}{b'}\right),$$

and

$$x_i = x > 0, \quad x_j = x + \theta, \quad x_k = x + 2\theta, \quad x_l = x + 3\theta,$$

for $0 < \varepsilon < \theta$. Then, for G_0 and G_t constructed this way, from (2.1),

$$V[G_t] - V[G_0] = \varepsilon (\mathfrak{h}(i/n) - \mathfrak{h}(j/n) - \mathfrak{h}(k/n) + \mathfrak{h}(l/n)),$$

with $\mathfrak{h}(i/n) = h(i/n) - h((i-1)/n)$. The requirement $V[G_t] - V[G_0] \geq 0$ is thus equivalent to $\mathfrak{h}(i/n) + \mathfrak{h}(l/n) \geq \mathfrak{h}(j/n) + \mathfrak{h}(k/n)$. One readily verifies that upon dividing both sides of the latter inequality by $\frac{1}{n}$, letting $d \rightarrow \infty$ (keeping c fixed), and next letting $c \rightarrow \infty$, yields $h'(1 - a'/b') \geq h'(1 - a/b)$ for all rational $0 < a'/b' < a/b$ so, by continuity of h'' , $h'' \geq 0$.

Next, we prove that requiring $V[G_t] - V[G_0] \geq 0$ implies $h'' \leq 0$. To this end, we now set

$$i/n = \left(1 - \frac{a}{b}\right), \quad j/n = \left(1 - \frac{a'}{b'}\right), \quad k/n = \left(1 - \frac{a'}{b'}\right) \left(1 + \frac{1}{c}\right), \quad l/n = \left(1 - \frac{a'}{b'}\right) \left(1 + \frac{2}{c}\right),$$

assuming $\left(1 - \frac{a'}{b'}\right) \left(1 + \frac{2}{c}\right) \leq 1$. Then, again

$$V[G_t] - V[G_0] = \varepsilon (\mathfrak{h}(i/n) - \mathfrak{h}(j/n) - \mathfrak{h}(k/n) + \mathfrak{h}(l/n)),$$

so requiring $V[G_t] - V[G_0] \geq 0$ is equivalent to $\mathfrak{h}(i/n) + \mathfrak{h}(l/n) \geq \mathfrak{h}(j/n) + \mathfrak{h}(k/n)$. One can verify similarly as above that upon dividing both sides of the latter inequality by $\frac{1}{n}$, letting $d \rightarrow \infty$ (keeping c fixed), and next letting $c \rightarrow \infty$, $h'(1 - a/b) \geq h'(1 - a'/b')$ for all rational $0 < a'/b' < a/b$ so, by continuity of h'' , $h'' \leq 0$. Thus, we conclude that $h'' = 0$, which, in view of the boundary conditions $h(0) = 0$ and $h(1) = 1$, proves the stated result. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.1. We first note that the probabilities of generating the minimal outcome in a two-shot experiment (i.e., in two independent draws) for the states of an arbitrarily given n -state lottery A with equal state probabilities are

$$(2n - 1)/n^2, \dots, 7/n^2, 5/n^2, 3/n^2, 1/n^2,$$

respectively. Thus, the second dual moment of A is given by

$$\mathbb{E}[\min(A_1, A_2)] = (1/n^2)x_n + (3/n^2)x_{n-1} + (5/n^2)x_{n-2} + (7/n^2)x_{n-3} + \dots + ((2n - 1)/n^2)x_1.$$

Hence, one readily verifies that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[C^{(3)}] &= \mathbb{E}[D^{(3)}], \\ \mathbb{E}[\min(C_1^{(3)}, C_2^{(3)})] &= \mathbb{E}[\min(D_1^{(3)}, D_2^{(3)})]. \end{aligned}$$

Indeed, the transformations $\mathcal{G}^{(3)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(3)}$ have the same (incremental) impact on the dual moments up to the second order. Furthermore, $F_{C^{(3)}}$ surpasses $F_{D^{(3)}}$ before crossing twice, so that $D^{(3)}$ dominates $C^{(3)}$ in third-degree dual stochastic dominance; see e.g., Proposition 4.9 of Wang and Young (1998).

It then follows from a Taylor expansion of the “dual utility premium”,

$$V \left[D^{(3)} \right] - V \left[C^{(3)} \right],$$

(see Theorem 4.4 of Wang and Young (1998)) that when the dual moments are equal up to the second order, $h''' \geq 0$ ($h''' \leq 0$) implies that the dual utility premium above is non-negative (non-positive). This proves the stated result. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.2. Since h'' is differentiable on $(0, 1)$, the third derivative of h being non-negative is equivalent to requiring that

$$\begin{aligned} & ([h(p_+) - h(p_0)] - [h(p_0) - h(p_-)]) - ([h(p_0) - h(p_-)] - [h(p_-) - h(p_{--})]) \\ & = h(p_+) - 3h(p_0) + 3h(p_-) - h(p_{--}) \geq 0, \end{aligned}$$

for any four equidistant probabilities $0 \leq p_{--} \leq p_- \leq p_0 \leq p_+ \leq 1$. We will show that this condition is satisfied whenever $D_n^{(3)}$ is preferred to $C_n^{(3)}$ for any $n \geq 3$ within DT. (The implication $h''' \leq 0$ follows similarly.)

We note that the DT evaluation of a lottery A with n outcomes $x_0 = 0 \leq x_1 \leq \dots \leq x_n$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned} V[A] &= \int_0^\infty x \, d(1 - \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x))) = - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i (\bar{h}(1 - F_A(x_i)) - \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x_{i-1}))) \\ &= \int_0^\infty \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x)) \, dx = \sum_{i=1}^n \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}), \end{aligned}$$

with $\bar{h}(p) = 1 - h(1 - p)$. Observe that $\bar{h} : [0, 1] \rightarrow [0, 1]$ with $\bar{h}(0) = 0$, $\bar{h}(1) = 1$, $\bar{h}' \geq 0$; and that $\bar{h}'' \geq 0$ is equivalent to $h'' \leq 0$. Here, $F_A(x_0) = 0$ by convention, so $1 - F_A(x_0) =$

$\bar{h}(1 - F_A(x_0)) = 1$. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} V[C_n^{(3)}] &= \sum_{i=1}^j \bar{h}(1 - F_{C_n^{(3)}}(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}) + \sum_{i=j+1}^{j+4} \bar{h}(1 - F_{C_n^{(3)}}(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}) \\ &\quad + \sum_{i=j+5}^n \bar{h}(1 - F_{C_n^{(3)}}(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}) \\ &=: \Sigma_1^{C_n^{(3)}} + \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(3)}} + \Sigma_3^{C_n^{(3)}}, \end{aligned}$$

with j corresponding to the state preceding the three states in bold that are always present in $C_n^{(3)}$, and similarly for $D_n^{(3)}$. Notice that

$$\Sigma_1^{C_n^{(3)}} = \Sigma_1^{D_n^{(3)}}, \quad \Sigma_3^{C_n^{(3)}} = \Sigma_3^{D_n^{(3)}}.$$

Furthermore,

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(3)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_j)) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1}) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+1})) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2}) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+2})) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3}) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+3})), \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma_2^{D_n^{(3)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j + 1/M) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_j)) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1} - 3/M) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+1})) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2} + 3/M) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+2})) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3} - 1/M) \bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+3})), \end{aligned}$$

suppressing the indices $C_n^{(3)}$ and $D_n^{(3)}$ for convenience. Define, for given $n \geq 3$, the probability q , $0 \leq q \leq 1 - 3/n$, such that

$$\begin{aligned} F(x_j) &= q, & F(x_{j+1}) &= q + 1/n, & F(x_{j+2}) &= q + 2/n, \\ F(x_{j+3}) &= q + 3/n, & F(x_{j+4}) &= q + 4/n. \end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned}\Sigma_2^{C_n^{(3)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j)\bar{h}(1 - q) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1})\bar{h}(1 - q - 1/n) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2})\bar{h}(1 - q - 2/n) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3})\bar{h}(1 - q - 3/n),\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(3)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j + 1/M)\bar{h}(1 - q) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1} - 3/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 1/n) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2} + 3/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 2/n) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3} - 1/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 3/n).\end{aligned}$$

Upon defining p_{--}, p_-, p_0, p_+ such that

$$\begin{aligned}3/n \leq 1 - q = p_+ \leq 1, &\quad 1 - q - 1/n = p_0, \\ 1 - q - 2/n = p_-, &\quad 1 - q - 3/n = p_{--},\end{aligned}$$

it then follows from the arbitrariness of $n \geq 3$, hence the arbitrariness of $0 \leq q \leq 1 - 3/n$, that

$$\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(3)}} - \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(3)}} = (1/M)\bar{h}(p_+) - (3/M)\bar{h}(p_0) + (3/M)\bar{h}(p_-) - (1/M)\bar{h}(p_{--}) \geq 0,$$

for any four equidistant probabilities $0 \leq p_{--} \leq p_- \leq p_0 \leq p_+ \leq 1$, whenever $D_n^{(3)}$ is preferred to $C_n^{(3)}$ for any $n \geq 3$. We note that $\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(3)}} - \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(3)}}$ is the DT analog of the utility premium in the EU model. Finally, observe that $\bar{h}''' \geq 0$ is equivalent to $h''' \geq 0$. This proves the stated result. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.4. By analogy to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first note that the probabilities of generating the minimal outcome in a three-shot experiment (that is, in three independent draws) for the states of an arbitrarily given n -state lottery A with equal state probabilities are

$$(3(n-1)n+1)/n^3, \dots, 37/n^3, 19/n^3, 7/n^3, 1/n^3,$$

respectively. Thus, the third dual moment of A is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [\min(A_1, A_2, A_3)] &= (1/n^3)x_n + (7/n^3)x_{n-1} + (19/n^3)x_{n-2} + (37/n^3)x_{n-3} \\ &\quad + \cdots + ((3(n-1)n+1)/n^3)x_1. \end{aligned}$$

Hence, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E} [C^{(4)}] &= \mathbb{E} [D^{(4)}], \\ \mathbb{E} [\min(C_1^{(4)}, C_2^{(4)})] &= \mathbb{E} [\min(D_1^{(4)}, D_2^{(4)})], \\ \mathbb{E} [\min(C_1^{(4)}, C_2^{(4)}, C_3^{(4)})] &= \mathbb{E} [\min(D_1^{(4)}, D_2^{(4)}, D_3^{(4)})]. \end{aligned}$$

Indeed, the transformations $\mathcal{G}^{(4)}$ and $\mathcal{B}^{(4)}$ have the same (incremental) impact on the dual moments up to the third order. Furthermore, $F_{C^{(4)}}$ surpasses $F_{D^{(4)}}$ before crossing three times, so that $D^{(4)}$ dominates $C^{(4)}$ in fourth-degree dual stochastic dominance; see e.g., Proposition 4.9 of Wang and Young (1998).

It then follows from a Taylor expansion of the “dual utility premium”,

$$V [D^{(4)}] - V [C^{(4)}],$$

(see Theorem 4.4 of Wang and Young (1998)) that when the dual moments are equal up to the third order, $h'''' \leq 0$ ($h'''' \geq 0$) implies that the dual utility premium above is non-negative (non-positive). This proves the stated result. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.5. Since h''' is differentiable on $(0, 1)$, the fourth derivative of h being non-positive is equivalent to requiring that

$$\begin{aligned} & [([h(p_{++}) - h(p_+)] - [h(p_+) - h(p_0)]) - ([h(p_+) - h(p_0)] - [h(p_0) - h(p_-)])] \\ & - [([h(p_+) - h(p_0)] - [h(p_0) - h(p_-)]) - ([h(p_0) - h(p_-)] - [h(p_-) - h(p_{--})])] \\ & = h(p_{++}) - 4h(p_+) + 6h(p_0) - 4h(p_-) + h(p_{--}) \leq 0, \end{aligned}$$

for any five equidistant probabilities $0 \leq p_{--} \leq p_- \leq p_0 \leq p_+ \leq p_{++} \leq 1$. We will show that this condition is satisfied whenever $D_n^{(4)}$ is preferred to $C_n^{(4)}$ for any $n \geq 4$ within DT. (The implication $h'''' \geq 0$ follows similarly.)

Recall that the DT evaluation of a lottery A with n outcomes $x_0 = 0 \leq x_1 \leq \dots \leq x_n$ is given by

$$V[A] = \sum_{i=1}^n \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}),$$

with $\bar{h}(p) = 1 - h(1 - p)$. Here, $F_A(x_0) = 0$ by convention, so $1 - F_A(x_0) = \bar{h}(1 - F_A(x_0)) = 1$. Hence,

$$\begin{aligned} V[C_n^{(4)}] &= \sum_{i=1}^j \bar{h}(1 - F_{C_n^{(4)}}(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}) + \sum_{i=j+1}^{j+5} \bar{h}(1 - F_{C_n^{(4)}}(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}) \\ &\quad + \sum_{i=j+6}^n \bar{h}(1 - F_{C_n^{(4)}}(x_{i-1}))(x_i - x_{i-1}) \\ &=: \Sigma_1^{C_n^{(4)}} + \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(4)}} + \Sigma_3^{C_n^{(4)}}, \end{aligned}$$

with j corresponding to the state preceding the four states in bold that are always present in $C_n^{(4)}$, and similarly for $D_n^{(4)}$. Notice that

$$\Sigma_1^{C_n^{(4)}} = \Sigma_1^{D_n^{(4)}}, \quad \Sigma_3^{C_n^{(4)}} = \Sigma_3^{D_n^{(4)}}.$$

Furthermore,

$$\begin{aligned} \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(4)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j)\bar{h}(1 - F(x_j)) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1})\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+1})) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2})\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+2})) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3})\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+3})) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+5} - x_{j+4})\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+4})), \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(4)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j + 1/M)\bar{h}(1 - F(x_j)) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1} - 4/M)\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+1})) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2} + 6/M)\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+2})) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3} - 4/M)\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+3})) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+5} - x_{j+4} + 1/M)\bar{h}(1 - F(x_{j+4})),\end{aligned}$$

suppressing the indices $C_n^{(4)}$ and $D_n^{(4)}$ for convenience. Define, for given $n \geq 4$, the probability q , $0 \leq q \leq 1 - 4/n$, such that

$$\begin{aligned}F(x_j) &= q, & F(x_{j+1}) &= q + 1/n, & F(x_{j+2}) &= q + 2/n, \\ F(x_{j+3}) &= q + 3/n, & F(x_{j+4}) &= q + 4/n, & F(x_{j+5}) &= q + 5/n.\end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned}\Sigma_2^{C_n^{(4)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j)\bar{h}(1 - q) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1})\bar{h}(1 - q - 1/n) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2})\bar{h}(1 - q - 2/n) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3})\bar{h}(1 - q - 3/n) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+5} - x_{j+4})\bar{h}(1 - q - 4/n), \\ \Sigma_2^{D_n^{(4)}} &= (x_{j+1} - x_j + 1/M)\bar{h}(1 - q) + (x_{j+2} - x_{j+1} - 4/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 1/n) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+3} - x_{j+2} + 6/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 2/n) + (x_{j+4} - x_{j+3} - 4/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 3/n) \\ &\quad + (x_{j+5} - x_{j+4} + 1/M)\bar{h}(1 - q - 4/n).\end{aligned}$$

Upon defining $p_{--}, p_-, p_0, p_+, p_{++}$ such that

$$\begin{aligned}4/n \leq 1 - q = p_{++} \leq 1, & \quad 1 - q - 1/n = p_+, & \quad 1 - q - 2/n = p_0, \\ 1 - q - 3/n = p_-, & \quad 1 - q - 4/n = p_{--},\end{aligned}$$

it then follows from the arbitrariness of $n \geq 4$, hence the arbitrariness of $0 \leq q \leq 1 - 4/n$, that

$$\begin{aligned}\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(4)}} - \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(4)}} &= (1/M)\bar{h}(p_{++}) - (4/M)\bar{h}(p_+) + (6/M)\bar{h}(p_0) - (4/M)\bar{h}(p_-) + (1/M)\bar{h}(p_{--}) \\ &\geq 0,\end{aligned}$$

or equivalently,

$$h(p_{++}) - 4h(p_+) + 6h(p_0) - 4h(p_-) + h(p_{--}) \leq 0,$$

for any five equidistant points $0 \leq p_{--} \leq p_- \leq p_0 \leq p_+ \leq p_{++} \leq 1$, whenever $D_n^{(4)}$ is preferred to $C_n^{(4)}$ for any $n \geq 4$. We note that $\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(4)}} - \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(4)}}$ is again the DT analog of the utility premium in the EU model. This proves the stated result. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.6. One can verify that, by construction, the first $m - 1$ dual moments satisfy

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E} [C^{(m)}] &= \mathbb{E} [D^{(m)}], \\ \mathbb{E} [\min(C_1^{(m)}, C_2^{(m)})] &= \mathbb{E} [\min(D_1^{(m)}, D_2^{(m)})], \\ \mathbb{E} [\min(C_1^{(m)}, C_2^{(m)}, C_3^{(m)})] &= \mathbb{E} [\min(D_1^{(m)}, D_2^{(m)}, D_3^{(m)})], \\ &\vdots \\ \mathbb{E} [\min(C_1^{(m)}, C_2^{(m)}, C_3^{(m)}, \dots, C_{m-1}^{(m)})] &= \mathbb{E} [\min(D_1^{(m)}, D_2^{(m)}, D_3^{(m)}, \dots, D_{m-1}^{(m)})],\end{aligned}$$

and that $F_{C^{(m)}}$ surpasses $F_{D^{(m)}}$ before crossing $m - 1$ times, so that $D^{(m)}$ dominates $C^{(m)}$ in m^{th} -degree dual stochastic dominance; see e.g., Proposition 4.9 of Wang and Young (1998).

It then follows from a Taylor expansion of the “dual utility premium”,

$$V [D^{(m)}] - V [C^{(m)}],$$

(see Theorem 4.4 of Wang and Young (1998)) that under the dual moment equalities up to the $(m - 1)^{\text{th}}$ order, $(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \geq 0$ ($(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \leq 0$) implies that the dual utility premium above is non-negative (non-positive). This proves the stated result. \square

Proof of Theorem 4.7. The proof follows from considering the “dual utility premium” given by

$$\Sigma_2^{D_n^{(m)}} - \Sigma_2^{C_n^{(m)}},$$

defined similarly as their analogs in the proofs of Theorems 4.2 and 4.5, and the definition of $(-1)^{m-1}h^{(m)} \geq 0$. □

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